Ludwig Wittgenstein’ın felsefe tarihindeki önemi nedir?’ sorusuna vereceğimiz yanıt, felsefeden ne anladığımızla doğrudan ilişkili değildir.

Wittgenstein’ın çekiciliği, felsefeye yaptığı göz alıcı katkıyla tam olarak açıklanamaz.

Terry Eagleton’ın zekice, biraz da hınzırca, “keşiş, mistik ve mühendis karışımı” diye tanımladığı filozofu tanımak için en iyi kılavuz, bir süre önce Türkçede yayımlandı.

Ray Monk’un, ünü ülkemize kendisinden önce gelen Wittgenstein monografisi ‘Dâhinin Görevi’nden söz ediyorum.

Dâhiler üzerine yazılan yaşam öykülerinde çoğunlukla iki eğilim görülür: Dâhi imgesini güçlendirme amacı ya da örseleme çabası. ‘Dâhinin Görevi’, aslında ikisini de yapmıyor. Ray Monk, olabildiğince nesnel kalmaya çalışmış; ancak unutmamak gerek, Wittgenstein’ınki gibi sıra dışı bir yaşam söz konusu olunca, nesnellik de biraz yoruma dönüşür. Bu yüzden, Monk’un çekimser kaldığı noktalar aslında zihnimizdeki dâhi-filozof imgesine tastamam uyuyor.

Felsefî aynı zamanda edebî

‘Dâhinin Görevi’, Wittgenstein felsefesine aşina olanlar için heyecan verici pek çok ayrıntı içeriyor. Filozofun yapıtının iki aşamasını da deha ürünü sayanlardansanız, Monk’un kitabında buna yeniden inanmak için bolca malzeme bulabilirsiniz. Yazar, Wittgenstein’ın kişisel yaşamındaki çalkantılarla felsefî gelişimini koşut ele alarak aslında bir tür çözümlemeye girişmiş. Örneğin, Wittgenstein’ın her gün umutsuzca intiharı düşündüğü dönem, Tractatus’un ilk ipuçlarının ortaya çıktığı zamana rastlıyor.

Ya da Russell ile arasındaki fırtınalı ilişki, onunla fikir ayrılığına düştüğü dönemle örtüşüyor. Monk’un örtük biçimde dile getirmek istediği şey, Wittgenstein’ın yaşamındaki derin kırılmaların, onun felsefesini nasıl etkilediğidir. Elbette, bu felsefî dönüşümü bütünüyle birtakım olaylara bağlamak indirgemeci bir yaklaşım olur; ama Wittgenstein’ın felsefesinin, yaşadıklarından tümüyle bağımsız olduğunu kim söyleyebilir? Kitaba ilişkin bir başka önemli ayrıntı da, Wittgenstein’ın yapıtlarını okuma konusunda yol gösterici bir söyleme sahip olması. Tractatus’a örneğin, mantıkçı pozitivistlerin baktığı yerden bakmanın nasıl da yanıltıcı olabileceğini gösteriyor Ray Monk. Etik üzerine söylenen boş laflara son vermek kesinlikle önemlidir fakat Wittgenstein bunu pozitivistçe değil, öte yakadan yapmıştır.

Zira Wittgenstein’ın kendi yapıtını ‘felsefî ama aynı zamanda edebî’ diye tanımlaması, ana fikrinin etik olduğunu söylemesi, bu bağlamda çok önemli yol göstericiler olarak okunabilir. Wittgenstein’ın ilk felsefe görüşünde anlamlandırma, bir resimleme ilişkisi olarak görülüyordu. İkincisinde ise bir alet olarak görülür, yani bir dile getirişin anlamı, onun olanaklı kullanışlarının toplamı diye ifade edilebilir. Ray Monk, Wittgenstein’a dair hiçbir ayrıntıyı (aşk da dahil) dışarıda bırakmadan işte bu köklü değişimin izini sürüyor.

Monk’un çağdaş analitik felsefe -özellikle Wittgenstein’ın iki dönem felsefesi- konusundaki yetkinliğini ve yalnızca bu monografi için onca belgeye ulaştığını, hepsini tek tek gözden geçirdiğini de hatırlatalım. (Türkiye’de beş-on belgeye dayanarak yaşam öyküsü yazan ‘uzman’ biyografların kulakları çınlasın!) Birkaç söz de çeviri için: Berna Kılınçer ve Tülin Er’in ortak çevirisi, özellikle Tractatus önermelerinde büyük ölçüde Oruç Aruoba’nın çevirisine bağlı kalmış. Yapıtın boyutu da göz önüne alındığında bu zahmetli çevirinin başarılı olduğu söylenebilir.

Wittgenstein’ı sevme sebepleri

Wittgenstein’ı sevmek için kuşkusuz hepimizin farklı sebepleri vardır. Kimimiz, elinde bir maşayla Popper’i tehdit ettiği için sevebiliriz onu; kimimiz polisiye romanları, Mind dergisindeki felsefe makalelerine yeğlediği; kimimiz de umutsuz aşklar yaşadığı için. Şair olarak Rilke’ye bağlılık duyduğu, Viyana Çevresi’nin toplantılarında şiir okuduğu için ya da Ingeborg Bachmann doktora tezini onun üzerine hazırladığı için sevenlerimiz de vardır. Fakat bütün bunlar belli bir ‘sanatsal vicdan’da birleşir. Ludwig Wittgenstein, felsefede yaptığı işin önemini anlasak da anlamasak da, zihinlerimizdeki dâhi imgesini pekiştiren bir figürdür. Onun, felsefeyi Platon’a düşülmüş bir dipnot olmaktan çıkardığını söyleyecek kadar ileri gitmeyeceğim ama Wittgenstein’ı felsefenin düşmanı olarak gören Popper’i ve yandaşlarını acımasız buluyorum. Ne dersek diyelim, Wittgenstein yapıtında kişisel varlığını koruyan filozoflardandır -tıpkı Schopenhauer gibi. Bu durum, Ray Monk’un kitabını olması gerekenden daha çekici kılıyor.

Ciddi felsefe meseleleri ve onları çözme umudu, bir filozofu yaşatan şeydir. Wittgenstein’da bunların ikisi de vardı. Sorularının peşinden sabırla ve ısrarla gidiyordu -tıpkı Sokrates gibi. En başından beri, beyni entelektüel bir ışıltıyla parlıyordu. Bu tutku, çağdaş felsefeye değişebilir açılımlar, Wittgenstein’a ise değişmez bir yer kazandırdı. Gellner’dı galiba, Wittgenstein’ın, yerini çektiği ıstırapla kazandığını söylemişti. Spekülatif konuşmak pahasına bunu tekrarlıyorum; çünkü acı, bazen kurtarıcı oluyor.

Dahinin Görevi

Ray Monk

Çev.: B.Kılınçer-Tülin Er Kabalcı Yayınları

Dil’in sınırlarına adanmış bir yaşamdan kesitler

1889’da Avusturya’daki en zengin ailelerden birinin çocuğu olarak Viyana’da doğdu.

Brahms, Mahler, Freud, Klimt gibi sanatçı ve düşünürler aileyle bağlantılıydı.

1903’te Russell’ın Matematiğin İlkeleri kitabını okuyuşu, felsefe kariyerinin başlamasına sebep oldu.

1914’te kendisine kalan 100 bin kronluk mirası aralarında Trakl ve Rilke’nin de bulunduğu sanatçılar arasında paylaştırılması için elden çıkarttı.

1. Dünya Savaşı’nda, Avusturya ordusu saflarında yer aldı. İncil’i ve Tolstoy’u okudu.

Savaştan sonra erken dönem felsefesinin başyapıtı Tractatus yayımlandı.

1919-1929 arasındaki on yıl boyunca felsefeyi izlemeyi bıraktı, bir tür inzivaya çekildi.

20’li yılların sonunda Viyana Çevresi ile yakınlık kurdu. Fakat toplantılarda felsefe konuşmayı değil şiir okumayı tercih etti.

1929’da Cambridge’e döndü. Amacı, Tractatus’taki belli zorlukları düzeltmekti.

30’lu yılların ortalarından itibaren matematik felsefesi üzerine yoğunlaştı.

1936’dan itibaren ün kazanacağı görüşlerini geliştirmeye başladı.

II. Dünya Savaşı sırasında yine felsefeye ara vererek hastane hademesi ve teknik asistan olarak hizmet verdi.

1947’de Cambridge’de son derslerini verdi.

1951’de prostat kanserinden öldü.

CAN BAHADIR YÜCE
kitap zamanı

Sayı: 1
Bölüm: Biyografi

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İmge bir olgudur.

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Dünya olgulara bölünür.

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İmgenin sunduğu anlamıdır.

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Biçim yapının olanağıdır.

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Dünya durum olan her şeydir.

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Toplam edimsellik dünyadır.

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Bir apriori gerçek imge yoktur.

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Dünya olguların toplamıdır, şeylerin değil.

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İşlerin durumları birbirlerinden bağımsızdır.

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Uzay, zaman ve renk nesnelerin biçimleridir.

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İmgenin öğeleri imgede nesnelerin yerini alır.

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Uzaysal nesne sonsuz uzayda yatıyor olmalıdır.

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Nesneler imgede imgenin öğelerine karşılık düşer.

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Töz durum olandan bağımsız olarak kalıcı olandır.

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İmgesel biçimi imgeyi temsil edemez; onu gösterir.

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İmge biçimini taşıdığı her edimselliği temsil edebilir.

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Ama imge kendini sunma biçiminin dışında sunamaz.

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İmge mantıksal bir uzaydaki olanaklı bir durumu sunar.

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Olgunun yapısı işlerin durumlarının yapılarından oluşur.

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Olgu imge olabilmek için imgelenenle ortaklaşa bir şey taşımalıdır.

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Nesne değişmez, kalıcı olandır; betileniş değişen, kalıcı olmayandır.

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Nesneler dünyanın tözünü oluştururlar. Buna göre bileşik olamazlar.

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Yalnızca imgeden onun gerçek mi yoksa yanlış mı olduğu bilinemez.

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Tüm nesneler verili olsa, bununla işlerin olanaklı tüm durumları da verilmiş olur.

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Eğer nesneyi biliyorsam, işlerin durumunda bulunmasının tüm olanaklarını da bilirim.

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İmgede ve imgelenende bir şey özdeş olmalıdır ki bütününde biri ötekinin bir imgesi olabilsin.

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Bir nesneyi bilebilmek için, hiç kuşkusuz dışsal değil ama tüm içsel özelliklerini bilmeliyim.

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İmge mantıksal uzaydaki olgu durumlarını, işlerin durumlarının kalıcı olmasını ve olmamasını temsil eder.

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İmge nesnesini dışardan sunar (duruş noktası sunma biçimidir), bu yüzden imge nesnesini doğru ya da yanlış olarak sunar.

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Mantıkta hiç bir şey olumsal değildir: Şey işlerin durumunda bulunabilirse, işlerin durumunun olanağı şeyde önceden yargılanmış olmalıdır.

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Her şey bir bakıma işlerin olanaklı durumlarının bir uzayındadır. Bu uzayı boş düşünebilirim, ama şeyi uzay olmaksızın değil.

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Karmaşıklar üzerine her bildirim onların bileşenleri üzerine bir bildirime ve karmaşıkları tam olarak betimleyen tümcelere ayrışır.

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Dünyanın hiçbir tözü olmasaydı, o zaman bir tümcenin anlamının olup olmadığı bir başka tümcenin doğru olup olmadığına bağımlı olurdu.

O relato começa quando Paul e Thomas se encontram internados no mesmo hospital de Viena. O primeiro está na unidade psiquiátrica, enquanto o narrador se encontra no serviço de doenças pulmonares, de onde lhe extraíram do tórax «um tumor do tamanho de um punho». O sobrinho do filósofo do ‘Tractatus logico-philosophicus’ teve de ser transportado, nos últimos 20 anos da sua vida, para o hospital psiquiátrico pelo menos duas vezes por ano, cada vez em condições piores e em espaços de tempo menores. Thomas Bernhard critica ferozmente os médicos e a medicina em geral por nunca terem sido capazes de classificar a doença mental do amigo.

Paul Wittgenstein é, à semelhança de muitos génios, um louco que rapidamente nos arrebata. Bernhard conta que tal como o tio Ludwig, Paul começou a dar, desde muito cedo, a sua riqueza porque pensava que assim conseguiria «espalhar os milhões sujos entre o povo limpo, para a salvação desse povo limpo e de si próprio» (p. 41). Foi a intensa paixão de Paul pela música que despoletou a amizade e simpatia de Bernhard que nunca tinha conhecido ninguém com uma tão grande «riqueza de pensamento», «espírito de observação» e «sensibilidade». Thomas acha que a loucura de Paul explodiu porque, ao contrário do tio, ele «reprimiu e não publicou a sua filosofia». No final, Thomas Bernhard acaba por confessar que se afastou de Paul, quando este já estava completamente louco, porque se queria afastar da morte.

O Sobrinho de Wittgenstein não é só sobre Paul Wittgenstein. É também (e talvez mais) sobre o próprio Thomas Bernhard que se socorre inúmeras vezes do amigo para poder falar livremente de si: «A diferença entre o Paul e eu consiste apenas no facto de o Paul se ter deixado dominar inteiramente pela sua loucura; ao passo que eu nunca pela minha, mesmo sendo tão grande como a dele, me deixei dominar inteiramente» (p. 35)

Os leitores de outros livros de Thomas Bernhard reconhecem rapidamente o estilo inconfundível do escritor austríaco: o texto parece que se apresenta como um longo e interminável parágrafo; não existem diálogos; o ritmo é vertiginoso; as ideias e palavras repetem-se sucessivamente. O escritor que já referiu que não gosta de enredos ou tramas, apresenta-nos personagens com uma grande carga emocional, que nos absorvem e por vezes até aniquilam, tal é o poder das descrições. O Sobrinho de Wittgenstein é um óptimo livro para ler numa tarde de chuva, em frente à lareira, com chávena de chá. De uma só vez. Não vá Thomas Bernhard pensar que não aguentamos os seus longos e deliciosos parágrafos.

[Texto publicado no Rascunho.net]

Diese Faustregel von Sprache = Weltsicht gilt für die Dame an der Aldi-Kasse in Würzburg dementsprechend ganz genauso wie für den Psychologie-Professor an der Humboldt-Universität in Berlin. Sicherlich ist der Psychologie-Professor ein bisschen enttäuscht, wenn er das hört, aber was kann ich tun? So ist’s nun mal.

Natürlich sind manche Leute – wie vermutlich unser Psychologie-Professor – ganz besonders erpicht darauf, sich durch ein eigenes, originelles Vokabular hervorzutun. Nach der Devise: „Mein Sprachgestus verrät schon meine intellektuelle Exzeptionalität!“ Man denke etwa an Heidegger, bei dem dieses Bemühen, nicht nur das Sein, sondern gleich auch noch Hölderlin zu übertrumpfen, zuweilen ja in reinen Dada umschlägt. Oder auch an seinen Antipoden Adorno, der Sätze schrieb, die gleich mehrfach gelesen sein wollen, bevor sie sich dann doch noch verständlich machen. Ein grandioser Trick! Und ist Ihnen je eine Seite Derrida problemlos eingegangen? Dann rufen Sie mich bitte an.

Aber selbstverständlich prägt dieses Bestreben, sich verbal gegen die Konkurrenz abzugrenzen, jeden Autor. Auch die vorsätzlich schlichten, die einfach schreibenden mit klarem Blick. Das können Sie bei Richard Rorty nachlesen, der selber zu den Meistern des begreiflichen Ausdrucks gehört, dabei aber in der Sache von allerhöchster Luzidität ist. (Das kann halt auch nicht jeder, das können sogar die Wenigsten!) Jeder Schreibende – wie jeder Sprechende – hat seine eigene Musik. Denken Sie nur an Joseph Roth, an dessen leise, wehmütige Melodien, oder an Philip Roth, dessen egomaner Furor ihn von „Portnoys Beschwerden“ bis zu „Sabbaths Theater“ getragen hat, oder an Gerhard Roth, der als Informatiker anfing.

Am exzentrischsten sträubt sich von unseren Fast-noch-Zeitgenossen vielleicht Thomas Mann dagegen, der Moderne durch sprachliche Klarheit Tribut zu zollen. „Ich lasse mir doch von so ein paar Proleten nicht mein an Goethe geschultes ironisches Literatur-Konzept kaputt machen“, scheint er zu sagen, und alle, die ähnlich empfinden, applaudieren heftig, Standing Ovations, bis tief in die Nacht. Auch ein Meister der klassischen Sprachbildbildung wie Vladimir Nabokov ist hier zu nennen. Auch wenn er Thomas Mann verachtete, geriet ihm jeder Satz zum Kabinettstückchen.

Alfred Döblin hingegen, der ja auch Psychiater und Arzt war, entfesselte die Sprache, auf dass sie den Irrsinn der Neuen Zeit widerspiegele. Der Innere Monolog vermengt sich in „Berlin Alexanderplatz“ mit dem Dröhnen des Schaufelbaggers, der am Rosenthaler Platz den Asphalt aufreißt. Welches Geräusch ist Ihnen lieber? Da hören wir dann vielleicht tatsächlich nicht einen Menschen, sondern eine ganze Stadt sprechen, oder, wie Hegel es halluziniert haben könnte, den Geist der Zeit, den Weltgeist. Auch Dostojewskij, habe ich mir sagen lassen, sei ein bunter Sprach-Mischer gewesen. Vor keinem genus dicendi, ob Zeitung, Schiller-Drama oder Traktat, sei er zurückgeschreckt, und in der fabelhaften Neuübersetzung von Svetlana Geier sei das nachzuprüfen.

Ich bitte Sie hiermit herzlich, dies zu tun.

When one says that such and such a proposition can’t be proved, of course that does not mean that it can’t be derived from other ones. But they may be no more certain than it is itself. (On this a curious remark by H. Newman.)

2. From its seeming to me—or everyone—to be so, it doesn’t follow that it is so.

What we can ask is whether it can make sense to doubt it.

3. If e.g. someone says “I don’t know if there’s a hand here” he might be told “Look closer”.—This possibility of satisfying oneself is part of the language-game. Is one of its essential features.

4. “I know that I am a human being.” In order to see how unclear the sense of this proposition is, consider its negation. At most it might be to taken to mean “I know I have the organs of a human”. (E.g. a brain which, after all, no one has ever yet seen.) But what about such a proposition as “I know I have a brain”? Can I doubt it? Grounds for doubt are lacking! Everything speaks in its favour, nothing against it. Nevertheless it is imaginable that my skull should turn out empty when it was operated on.

5. Whether a proposition can turn out false after all depends on what I make count as determinants for that proposition.

6. Now, can one enumerate what one knows (like Moore)? Straight off like that, I believe not.—For otherwise the expression “I know” gets misused. And through this misuse a queer and extremely important mental state seems to be revealed.

7. My life shews that I know or am certain that there is a chair over there, or a door, and so on.—I tell a friend e.g. “Take that chair over there”, “Shut the door”, etc. etc.

8. The difference between the concept of ‘knowing’ and the concept of ‘being certain’ isn’t of any great importance at all, except where “I know” is meant to mean: I can’t be wrong. In a law-court, for example, “I am certain” could replace “I know” in every piece of testimony. We might even imagine its being forbidden to say “I know” there. [A passage in Wilhelm Meister, where “You know” or “You knew” is used in the sense “You were certain”, the facts being different from what he knew.]

9. Now do I, in the course of my life, make sure I know that here is a hand—my own hand, that is?

10. I know that a sick man is lying here? Nonsense! I am sitting at his bedside, I am looking attentively into his face.—So I don’t know, then, that there is a sick man lying here? Neither the question nor the assertion makes sense. Any more than the assertion “I am here”, which I might yet use at any moment, if suitable occasion presented itself.— Then is “2 x 2 = 4” nonsense in the same way, and not a proposition of arithmetic, apart from particular occasions? “2 x 2 = 4” is a true proposition of arithmetic—not “on particular occasions” nor “always”—but the spoken or written sentence “2 x 2 = 4” in Chinese might have a different meaning or be out and out nonsense. And “I know that there’s a sick man lying here”, used in an unsuitable situation, seems not to be nonsense but rather seems matter-of-course, only because one can fairly easily imagine a situation to fit it, and one thinks that the words “I know that…” are always in place where there is no doubt, and hence even where the expression of doubt would be unintelligible.

11. We just do not see how very specialized the use of “I know” is.

12. —For “I know” seems to describe a state of affairs which guarantees what is known, guarantees it as a fact. One always forgets the expression “I thought I knew”.

13. For it is not as though the proposition “It is so” could be inferred from someone else’s utterance: “I know it is so”. Nor with the utterance together with it not being a lie.—But can’t I infer “It is so” from my own utterance “I know etc.”? Yes; and also “There is a hand there” follows from the proposition “He knows that there’s a hand there”. But from his utterance “I know…” it does not follow that he does know it.

14. That he does know takes some shewing.

[*TO BE CONTINUED...*]

Şaka bir yana, okulda birbirlerini tanıyıp tanımadıkları hakkında bugüne kadar ben herhangi bir belge okumadım, dikkatimden kaçmış olabilir. Ama sanıyorum ki bunu ciddi olarak iddia eden de olmadı (David Irving gibi egzantrikler dışında). Ama son dönemde ortaya çıkan belgelerle aynı matematik hocasından ders aldıkları bu hocanın öğrencileri hakkında tuttuğu notlardan anlaşılmış (ne kadar güvenilir olduğu her zamanki gibi zamanla anlaşılacak).

Beni bu konuya geri getiren ise Wikipedia'da Wittgenstein maddesinin altında rastladığım şu fotoğraf oldu.

Güya resimde de oklarla gösterildiği üzere bu yeniyetme bastıbacaklar Hitler ile Wittgenstein'mış. Ben her iki çocuğun da kişilik özelliklerini dikkate alarak resim çekilirken öyle uslu durup görünebileceklerine ihtimal vermiyorum ya, neyse.. Gerçi ikisinin de süper somurtmuş olması şüphe uyandırmıyor değil.

İlginç olan şu ki, eğer bu resimdekiler gerçekten onlarsa ve resimde aralarında sadece bir kaç kişinin bulunabileceği kadar yakın bir sınıf ortamında birlikte bulundularsa bu tarihin en büyük keşiflerinden biri olarak kayıtlara geçmelidir.

Şans, kader ya da genetik deyin, insan soyunun, yani görünürde insanı andıran bu iki kişinin dünyada birbirinden olabilecek en farklı yaratılışta kişiler olduğunu varsayarsak, o sınıfta neler yaşanmış olabileceğini tahmin bile edemiyorum. Wittgenstein'in son derece derslerle alakasız, arkadaşlarını küçük gören ve asosyal bir çocukluk dönemi geçirdiğini biliyoruz. Buna karşın, belki tek ortak özellikleri olarak Hitler de derslere karşı ilgisiz ve kendi dünyasında yaşayan bir çocuktu ancak bazı tanıklar zayıf ve çelimsiz çocukları pataklamayı sevdiğini belirtiyor. Bu durumda Hitler, acayip derecede kıl bir öğrenci olan Wittgenstein'i dövdü mü? Wittgenstein bu olaydan sonra mı böyle oldu? Hitler'in Yahudi düşmanlığının başlamasında bu gıcık Yahudi çocuğun rolü var mıdır? Bu soruların cevaplarını aramamız gerekiyor:)

Şaka bu sefer iyice öbür yana, ben bu çocukların aynı okulda ya da aynı sınıfta okuduklarına ihtimal vermekte güçlük çekiyorum, zira Wittgenstein devrin en güçlü ailelerinin birinin çocuğu iken, Hitler son derece sıradan bir aileden gelmekteydi. Wittgenstein ailesi evde özel öğretmenlerle eğitime tabi tuttukları çocuklarını neden sonradan Linz'de sıradan bir ortaokula göndermeye karar vermiş olabilirler, anlam vermek gerçekten zor, zira maddi durumlarında bir kötüleşme olmamıştı.

Her neyse, facebook'ta birbirlerini eklememiş olmaları da bu teorimi destekliyor zaten.

"O mundo é independente da minha vontade."

proposição 6.373, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Ludwig Wittgenstein

Paul Engelmann, discepolo di Loos, fu incaricato nel 1932 da Margaret Stonborough, sorella di Ludwig Wittgenstein, di procedere con la progettazione e la succesiva realizzazione della propria abitazione. Wittgenstein in quel periodo stava passando un periodo di forte depressione, nata da un susseguirsi di delusioni ed insuccessi, e girava voce che stesse meditando un suicidio. Margaret così per tenere occupato il fratello, sfruttando il suo forte interesse per l'architettura (aveva infatti già costruito una baita dove si era ritirato a vivere per un pò, e realizzato diversi mobili per amici viennesi) e la sua simpatia per Loos, incontrato circa quindici anni prima, decise di coninvolgerlo nella realizzazione. D'altronde Ludwig conosceva bene Engelmann, ed intrattenevano un rapporto di amicizia già al tempo della guerra. Ma come in ogni azione buona e giusta, successe l'imprevedibile. Wittgenstein si impadronisce letteralmente del processo progettuale, scanzando Engelmann, e, nonostante in realtà modificò di pochissimo l'impianto pensato dal primo progettista, proseguì i lavori con precisione maniacale. Famoso l'aneddoto in cui alla domanda di un fabbro che chiedeva se anche il millimetro fosse imporante, il filosofo viennese rispose con impazienza: anche il mezzo millimetro è fondamentale. L'esasperazione di tale inutile pedissegua precisione portò lo stesso a far demolire un intero solaio per farlo realizzare 3 cm più in alto.
Che anche i nuovi grandi neofiti dell'architettura si comportino con così tanta ingenua lungimiranza?

Che l'architettura sia uno tra gli hobby di Brad Pitt era certamente noto ai fan, ma che stesse procedendo addirittura con delle realizzazioni, con collaborazioni imporanti come quelle di Thom Mayne, leader dei Morphosis, forse lo era un pò meno. Addirittura, ancora, abbracciando una corrente di tendenza, come quella della bioarchitettura. E, se non fosse ancora abbastanza, sfruttando la sua fama, e la logica di diffusione delle informazioni del web, è riuscito ad attivare un progetto quanto mai lodevole sia per impegno sociale che per concretezza di mezzi. Il progetto in questione è il MakeItRight Project, atto ad un tentativo di soluzione per una questione drammatica: la devastazione della città di New Orleans. MakeItRight Project ha infatti l'obiettivo di ricostruire interamente quello che era il quartiere residenziale di Lower Ninth Ward, tra i più devastati dall'uragano Katrina. Tra gli architetti coinvolti, tanto per usare un'espressione tra le più banali usate dalla media dei critici, tra le più grandi firme dello star system architettonico: Adjaye Associates, Billes Architecture, BNIM Architects, Constructs, Eskew & Dumez & Ripple, MVRDV, Pugh and Scarpa Architecture, Shigeru Ban Architects e Trahan Architects. Pare che si voglia creare un qualcosa di estremamente eterogeneo. Ma, nonostante le ottime intenzioni, i 5 milioni di dollari donati dallo stesso Brad Pitt, lo stimolo offerto ad architetti che altrimenti sarebbero come al solito alla prese con progetti milionari, la volontà "to have a mixture of voices" , traspare una forte ingenuità di fondo che potrebbe minare la fattibilità del progetto.

Che senso ha, in un progetto in cui il carattere speculativo dovrebbe passare in secondo piano, inserire un cast tanto blasonato nel copione? I più malfidati potrebbero sostenere che probabilmente è l'ennesima occasione di avviare un processo di marketing o sponsorizzazione privata di qualche tipo, che in effetti non c'era bisogno di tirare così tanto la mano. Straordinario il fatto che alcuni autori di Gibellina Nuova muovano critiche simili. Il pregiudizio di una professionista vede nell'intrusione a casa propria di un estraneo porta però i detrattori di MakeItRight Project a non studiare cose si sta realmente tentando di fare.
Prima di tutto è quasi del tutto ignorato il fatto che il progetto è basato su donazione libera di privati, donazione a cui partecipano le ditte costruttrici tenendomargini di guadagno molto basso, e che le case costruite saranno poi vendute ai proprietari dei terreni delle case distrutte. Non è lo stesso preso in considerazione nelle critiche il fatto che si sta tentando di realizzare non la solita baraccopoli post terremoto, stile Assisi, ma un quartiere nel quale viene evitata ogni metafisica della morte, ma una allegra, se vogliamo esser severi nichilista, volontà di riscatto da parte della vita, data dalla diversità dei progetti e dal loro cozzare l'uno con l'altro. Niente di utopico insomma, solo un sogno pragmatico per fare un servizio alla società. Per una critica più approfondita non ci resta che aspettare la realizzazione del quartiere. Ma soprattutto i commenti degli abitanti. Sempre che ce ne saranno.

Fire-boiling water, we know experience's teacher, not of breakfast (less so pain) but change: Your knowing will as well but people are to stay informed. Good to look it up, even formulae (one's not enough), for if someone says to know something, it ought be someone that, by general agreement, is in a position to know that: Belief's reasonable assumption supported by facts points to always present. Military courts, the martial, might set a standard, but not for boiling frozen conceivable as wrong; the only 'mistake' that might refute all knowledge is that of assuming any fact refutable by doubt. This is unpredictable, beyond good reason and bad cause, existing as a function; ali(v)e, actually.

Conceptual known's dating games of linguistics is the non-difference between knowing and leaning on facts, the latter's irreversibility of position. You might say you know of someone else's pain, which means you abide a belief in their pain's presents; these are not the same levels of knowable and neither constitutes any form of knowledge. Abstract equivalencies of knowledge always debatable, the only one that isn't is identity; to some degree of relation.

If you're not stoned, statement itself is professed of one's believable knowing.

Climbing high enough, your name might not change with the oxygen density. In answering a wrong question, you/r name might even feel changed; 'inner experience' can't even know you something about poetry, much less of yourself. Knowing what a name is called ought not be considered grounds for saying how it will end up. Wrong about your own name?, could be just a bad day; wrong about naming means you are in(s)ane. Go ahead and make your mind up first: The possibility of question follows and from the potential to determine through testing. Claims of the will, & to knowledge, are a good sign-post to mark certainty, but no one drives eyes shut to navigate from what one's told the distance or speed limit be mark(et)ed as. Go ahead, prove my name wrong! Get a badge if you need 2. "It is part of the language-game with people's names that everyone knows his name with the greatest certainty."

You want to arrive between 580 & 1? We all either are or used to be children one time once. Knowing could be habitual or aorist, relevant to elliptical contexts, contingent on a substitute—for example some teacher—and still the Chinese box echoing "I know that..." encloses, endorses—enfolding—the distinction between forms of expression as possibility link by agreement in underall reference of what they denote; 'referents' or reverence if you're into instantiations. Intonation is a key indication to intention as mentioning meaning; but good luck ironing it out to completion of certainty.

But I don't use words to say I am in a certain state, whereas the mere assertion does not reply to such an assertive asking this point could be made in the following zoo: Notice "has meaning" only when it is performatively uttered by someone; and corporate 'people' too.

Recognition comprises possession of knowledge. [e.g. "a-dew love due V.P."]

Prior use of experience molds perception as to natural and non-normative usage. 'I can tell you what kind of a... that is, and no doubt about it.' Impersonal expressions by still, a subject [prolepsis] mean not are productive in disagreements contrary: If you don't know, awefull good idea to admit that up front (for then your mind is clear for "to learn"). I'm guessing his name as 'L.W.' much as "connections" has only one 'C'. An 'if you be mistaken?' is a bit more forcefully kinder. Best to let 'em all decide for yourselves, if they're honest. e.g., 'I have access to secret documents but have never looked at one of them.' Am I stuck in this country my whole long life? "Only if I can't have been mistaken." Miss taken.

If the 'standard' book says it's right, not just an "I've heard..." and you tried it out yourself, are pretty sure; these don't preclude the possibility of error (as Professor Einstein showed the æther through the Lorentz-Fitzgerald and Galapagos demonstrated regarding giraffes depicted pre-Darwin) and proving the line of logic you're investigating 'right' by positing the expectation of outcome (Sir Arthur Stanley we grant exception—he knew the numbers, worked-out) is the definition of treating truth as though some kind mere of game. The danger in wanting to end meaning by discovering expression itself, and the mind of which one uses it, instead of always thinking of the practice is why one repeats the statement so oneself too often, because it is as if one must see what one is looking for in the expression as the feeling it gives you. 

When it comes to rock-solid incontrovertible, principles of physics are the best of safe bets; the world-views derived from them shift a pair of dimes.

Guided in your movements by propositions of physics: Great idea if you want to get to work alright. For conducting your guidance in treatment of others: Is a human being a few dollars worth of chemicals' elaborate structure? We could fight about 'it' but fools combat over people and heresy is to equate reason = persuasion. Is water in the kettle as kettle in the flame the same as your old friend and friend who's old? "I don't know confidently [t]hat I am to answer here." Different cases may seem a likeness of difference, but that's for knowledge to judge: If you doubt your friends, you're paranoid (though having good grounds to doubt them follows from being active, a philosopher).

If your friend's name has always been that, vociferous pronouncements of its having been changed ought not compel you to back-date one assumption.

615. Now does that mean: "I can only make judgements at all because things behave thus and thus (as it were, behave kindly)"? What would the effect be had he mistypoed 'kinky' right there?

Be-(a)ware of: Clever Texa's, their idioms; too many sports metaphors (not all of life comes with uniformity, padding and there are some ugly cheerleaders); apparent necessity as the mother of equivocal induction; changing horses mid-stream; if you put 'assurance' on payroll, you can't go/get mad when you're told something declared about to go, wrong: Turns out OK.

For biology, such with 'natural' classifications, "I know" means 'I am aware of the generally accepted understanding tested to scientific rigors of validity.' If you need to go look at those nerves to see if they're really there, that's a psychopath: Even if s/he became a noted brain surgeon. The ever-present possibility of delusion ought not concern one, for suspecting oneself of constant and shape-shifting error without any evidence to suggest one as being such in the definition of being deluded: Just don't worry about if you're true, your right. But color does get kind of sticky... The fact that language is structured of limitless interpretations [i.e. propositions] from rules abstracted through meaning, that means everyone already understands your assertions of knowledge bear some degree of possible fallibility—since we're all human (even corporate management, when you get them alone)—therefore trying to enumerate which ones are not particularly subject to doubt is beyond silly to folly: For your form of their statement as belief in one's knowledge may be falsified (this is known as: Interpretation—and not everyone who believes in its existence is a 'relativist', some of us just think truth is more complicated than the most extremely forceful of what the loudest one says as "I know."—even when your 'he's in power).

Memory one can't get away from, if that interpretation thing bothered you.

Simply being wrong is not a huge problem; but to do wrong means making the mistake of having been wrong in assuring false certainty as proof of correct.

To the belief that the possibility of error is the best grounds to exclude attempt to avoid it: You don't refuse to breathe, do you?

Now, while rigid polarization of falsification and its opposite do lead to a great many, if not of quite all, errors; certain conceptual dualities, such as dreaming/perceiving, pregnant-'not pink', reality & non-sense—these only make sense in context of one another so that stating one's not-existence actually removes grounds for the possibility of its either (if I'm dreaming that, you can correct me when we wake up).

Though there are always, of course, exceptions it follows not that any particular case must therefore be one.

"Slip her the tongue" (bad in a schoolyard and equally, though differingly, so at a college formal; at a Mexican Deli, depends on how eclectic your tastes are there, bud). Now, this is also important: If you've checked to the best of your abilities and it still sits there looking right, to say there still may be a mistake is actually an error according to what you know. It's an invalid conclusion based on the assumption that your certainty of not being wrong may still, somehow, be a mistake. If you want to do that, go ahead. But when your job is dealing with stuff that could kill people, people who do so themselves (excludes here the military—Special Forces, obviously a specific exception) or lots and lots of money that keeps human beings healthy, or at very least within the realm of 'not-death' you need to stop doing this: Now.

[I don't do 'maths'—I'm just, really not that kind of guy!]

In daily life, 'not-wrong' is neither a category nor a proposition; it's to be approached with requisite fear, but not trembling (particularly if you're into that stuff we were just discussing). For math and communication through language are of innately different kinds, mathematics purely—and formalized languages based on it—admit substitutions without changing value. Linguistic propositions, which in science describe relations representable in specific instances by values of number, have subtly different meanings depending on the semantic context of their expressions; one's wife, for instance, may object to being called merely 'beautiful' (if that's what the cow you dumped her for was previously so termed by oneself), but even Henry the Eighth could sweetalk some lovely gal's head right off with a few wisps of attendant, his pen, the word 'gorgyas.'

If you tell a moon-landing astronaut he never went to the moon, they are allowed to punch you.

Saying 'know that...' doesn't guarantee it, even if one means it. I just flew in from a part of the world where the people have only indefinite information, or none at all, about the possibility of flying. I tell them I have just flown there from... [I can't finish the joke] Asking about a mistake where none has been made or evidenced reveals a fundamental misunderstanding; either about the specific in content all the way on up to the nature of reality. 'If I don't trust this evidence why should I trust any evidence?' Though often difficult to tell the extent to which a mistake's possibility is to have come into being, it's a good idea to differentiate according to categorization. Such as the difference between what Moore knows and what Wittgenstein alleges more accurately.

You know what I always say: Any lecture or reading you walk away from not certain whether or not you've been drugged? That's a good one like dreaming the rain.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/2272321.stm

Questions of method are often the best means of assuaging doubt, practically; for certainly are times when knowledge is incorrect and not all fact is advertised under "knowing." (3/21-22)

Previous experiences can indicate good cause for being certainty, but with certain facts further reassurance cannot result in there any more certain. (23)

What one does and says from day to day and what some, one may take from the knowledge of this is a much firmer grounds for being secure in the veracity of statements truly knowing, for since "to know" can only make sense in a particular situation—not according merely to grammatical analyses or observations (since the former may be correct but irrelevant, the latter could merely look right and/or be misinterpreted)—but because experience makes us aware of certain tendencies, many of which are—or might merely appear—incontrovertible as fact, "[t]he utterance 'I know...' can only have its meaning in connection with the other evidence of [subjective] knowing." (26)

Spells, 'be-which's, the Almighty, these are the statements for truth their not being permissible as mistaken in self-as-divorcing from personally and freed of witness them to oppose; but in credible circumstance, or at words which mean them so to be, a certain practicality signifies statements of certainly dubious merit recommended by naming the (f)act that, even in playing games, of an error committed must lead only to recognition's own void in ab-sense of nihilisn't. (27)

Yes, the eternal doubter is correct: Since we can't apprehend things except as by words and words also represent things, one can find technical grounds to question any assertion; but such logical circuits (and short) as "investigating investigation-ors"—the realm only for philosophers and decreation of -'isms' our discipline hoping and to remake—don't tell you which piece of information is relevant or superfluous but interesting, pretty much just helps you analyze how right it is in a particular context with references to assumptions you set out from—and it's 'is' never non-neutral. (29)

What Moore 'knows' is the most evident example of that which is generally agreed upon—i.e. saying obviously non-controvertible (I know, controversial) things isn't the best way to remain true, it's really only the [reverse of the ol' "Fortun(at)e Teller" routine leading to much the same point] best way to be thought of as right; mostly. (30)

The next day: "Games I can handle; the jokes we leave to le français?" (31)

[he goes to Gertrude Stein here, honestly] (4/3)

It's awful tough to know someone's intention in meaning; self-reported statements of intent can be wrong, which sucks because then you're really up a tree; other times there is a definite relevance you didn't realize till after: Then/that one feels foolish; when it comes to a name, even one so simple as a word, it's like trying to doubt of your hand. (4)

[Here there is still a big gap in my thinking. And I doubt whether it will be filled now.] (5)

Use and experience are prior to metaphysical questions—and all questions of doubt must begin to end as these first—in satisfaction is determined according to fulfillment of lack: Language exists, languages are just their and work; but reality functions. (6)

Kittens and milk, do children eat mice?, I am typing this at 3:11: Is it early or late? (When did I wake up.) (7)

Absence of doubt may not imply a metaphysical statement of certainty within a proposition—although knowledge involves the possibility of doubt (though dispensed with through considerations of relevance)—so that representations of language in reality constitute a more than less imperfect faculty of recognition according to perception and memory; which, though it may be interesting, remains meaningless before a proposition is stated-as-perceived. (8)

Quibbling over senses and possibly meaning always possible, the proof of knowledge is neither in its statement nor of its place in a system of ostensibly rigorous beliefs—even if they're all just about some archaic, self-centered, out-moded, egotistical, fetishizing, solipsistic and juvenilely delusive image of one's 'self'—since to doubt the beliefs acquired from within this fixes no grounds for possibility in truth or falsification. (9)

As some beliefs when proven wrong are not so big of a deal, others remove the total foundation of entire complexes of thought and perception and feeling—it's a really good idea to be careful of the former and exercise judgment when employing doubts and even certain applications of the latter, because should these be discovered as mistaken, you sir are royally, totally fucked— and even equally if not moreso when clinging to these without bothering to rethink their justifications when explanation's found lacking—since playing a game by all the rules ensures neither victory nor certainty (basically: Even if all your points are right is no guarantee they're pointing the right way). (10)

Logic isn't the magic strategy that means you and all who agree with your purpose are accurate, you jackasses, it's a methodological process of negotiation between factual contingencies and relatively stable meanings in language—no matter how many equations of digit you use to make look right—and trying to describe its characteristics theoretically instead of also employing justly and selflessly its principles creates an impossibility of being true when one is devoid of some manner of trust in both its relation of assumptions and final conclusion from outcome: Saying "it's logical" guarantees not a valid conclusion (in the most disturbing instances, being logical provides even stringent, less outcome). (11)

"Doubt itself rests only on what is beyond doubt." (12)

The reason questioning without good or some cause is bad as that leads to disagreements where there is no simple way to demonstrate who's 'really' right without recourse to arbitrary or factional decisions which pit one contestant against some other one merely playing a game in words. (13-14)

Whether one's certainty admits some small doubt or no, the actual effect of the intention is what's at stake in action as language or practice; some people have different standards for knowing than the rest of us (i.e. fools, medical professionals, the insane, philosophers...administration appointees, etc.). (15)

Some are certain designations whose names, in being so-called, refer more immediately to concepts rather than objects; in such circumstance, actual questions and effects of their usage act more like a backround rather than functioning as an assumption—either of which can be readily doubted—but, in serving relationally (rather than metaphor), two considerations result: a) their misuse if falsifiable but not practically so and b) the actual application cannot be usefully said to rest on propositional assumptions of knowledge; in other words, they have been arbitrarily instituted but are not subjective. (16)

Truth is not a necessity; it's an imperative to modality. (17)

Main Ideas: One can't prove someone's belief wrong, only one's belief in knowledge. Fundamental agreement must provide a basis in difference to achieve actuality knowing. If you know it only, or if others do and don't say, sometimes that has to be enough. Some things, while equally true, fit a lot better in a particular situation (or: Just because it's a fact doesn't follow one ought to present it). If God made your hand, isn't much more can be done to 'prove' it exists or is there—your belief about its one's own known concern.

Wittgenstein on MySpace!

The Fragments of Herakleitos

foreign language, 'artistic' link

It wasn't so much of an all-boys club, just looks it 'u kno'?

   1. The great variety of corrective modalities, as well of doubted validity, which precludes a real in the world, is too obviously exclusive of trust in denying its existence of evidence. In calculations of number, should one not be error, the outlying example is put not as the proper in standard, that it might refute confusion a priori, so that one has needs of approach to a theorization of physicalities in terms of relation; rather than their own self-same aspect. Though an interpretation of some word's sense may be called into question, the actual meaning of any such object in content is fixed of stability's use. (300-306)

   2. Novelty's innovation in the realm of verbal expression need not induce hesitancy for lack of a term full of identity to the definiens in question, for none to remain fixed in metaphor is related as the necessary division in arbitrating what's known and certainly so. To be sure, these are not simple acts of idealism, absolute in the con-sense of empirical and theoretic principles; rather, a more experienced application of rules extracted from acquired familiarity up to, and encompasses, the point at which doubt, if sensible, ought be adopted according to historical reality, grammatical analyses, biological development—logical necessities. The prevalence of nature, uniform in her justification of abstract reasonings from experience—upon which almost all knowledge depends—is not to be doubted so much as examined. If the mind were not engaged by argument to make this step, it must be induced by some other principle of equal weight and authority, in terms of what that doubt is, may well be worth the game of enquiry. (But not as if we chose this principle!) (307-318)

   3. Logic's Rule: Even the most rigid must be malleable to reality's circumstance. (319)

B. Content

   1. As the content of the idea inherent from within a proposition is flexible enough to traverse the specificities of empirical proposition to rigid designation, and these phraseable in each of other's own terminologies, in theory, human memory may give rise to apparently rational suspicion. When this is in contradiction to established and verified facts of inquiries through knowledgeable science, one ought not call such a course one of 'reason', for that is to fix suspicion upon a groundless intent with no cause. But to doubt the common validity of universally human basis in fact for truths reasonable to believe, i.e. those which are analytic in their application, one as often must defer to proper nouns as doubt in expressing the readiness to believe certain things (as well as uncertain, but true). (319-331)

   2. The possibility would of course never imply the actuality as lack is potential. If you do not know or have a doubt, must a question beg to ask: Otherwise what turns out bad is quite simply your own making, what good merely accident fortuitous; & doubt must be even more stringently contextualized (if one is to remain reasoning). Such as in courts, the likelihood of any action is unknowable without determining the circumstances leading to its undertaking. Though these change over time, the actual formal process develops by re-appropriating its historical precedent in relation to relevant instances of its whole as known. Who is unaware of these matters in the general, more qualitatively in their specifics ad infinitum proportionate to expertise, are in the most common instances with us on nearly equal footing (but in the practice shown incapable of the most basic acts of reason). For which metaphors and superficial similarities are taken as propositions of identity because some facts are necessary for expressing a rational doubt without which no coherence can be... (331-342)

   3. Objective validity of matter, states of affairs, the impossible hilarity of investigating every one, thing without underlying assumptions are rules necessary for humans communicating and in their absence is only confusion and (t)error. (You don't understand my German, do you?): If one doubts always, either the instruments of observation or faculties of perception, please go do it in a studio where there are set up complexes of social apparatus for directing such impulses contained? (343-346)

C. Reasoned

   1. We may observe, that, in these phenomena, the belief of the correlative object is always presupposed; without which the relation could have no effect. Just as statements take their meaning from context, independent of perception, their meaning is not determined by their situation, but by their need of ability to be so within a frame of reference. This refers to a capacity to perceive. In other words, remarks taken out of one context may be reconstituted in a similar, never fully identical, situation given a sufficient justification. For these one expands the field of interpretation to comprise the judgment of its new sense as an extension of its meaning. (347-351)

   2. Questions about the use or intention of sentences, often much better than jumping straight to nullification or doubt of a proposition: One need not re-assert the underlying assertion of a proposition and you can't doubt something with any sort of integrity until you have understood it properly. (352-354)

   3. Doubts often have a purpose as well, for which framing one's response to them is helped by awareness of the nature of the doubt. Knowing a fact grants no privilege of access to foreknowledge in how a doubt or further examination might be possible because, if one were aware of this, means there has not been a fully exhaustive—i.e. "final"—verification of the objective under consideration. Knowledge is a peculiarly human institution and/or capacity (depending on whether one feels critical or like analysis), which is linked to concerns of biology, but not commensurate with them (since it is a fact unique to humans—as our knowing builds off of others' and itself; [outside, that is, of the American Intelligence Community]). (355-361)

   4. This transition of thought from the cause to the effect proceeds not from reason. (362-363)

[The actual examples of physical bodies, relevant where knowledge is equated with something as innately human, e.g. opposable thumbs and walking upright, seems to draw on the following: 1) not only immediate to all who experience the subjective possession of the digits in question, but also relevant even for children; since physicality is how infants learn to relate to their surroundings in terms of self/other and difference 2) also similar to Rousseau's "Language of Action" which isn't maybe specifically relevant—for the man thought as he wrote this—but an interesting point for comparison 3) as examples, feet and hands have a lot to do with, in English at least, metaphors for "to know" (under-stand, grasp an concept, hold an opinion, etc.)] (364-369)

   5. To doubt the conceptual significance of certain words leads only to derived from nihilism in demonstrating that its absence is a condition of using language and that questions of knowledge defer or destroy these contingencies. Since doubt in itself is not an objective fact, unless it must be given some specific determination of significance, would follow that factual assertions carry similar semantic weight as propositions which do not admit it. (370-372)

   6. As to the doubt arising from belief in that which can not be rigidly fixed to an absolute level of certainty ought not be believed, that is a bit bi-polar; for language's representation of reality—structure(d) as a game—functions as well as instructing or misleads: Subjective certainty, even which calculates a determined level of doubt into its outcome, does not by necessity contradict any statement's assertion because propositions can be explained in other terms and their effect can be produced by an-other logic of calculation ('logical' need not mean "truth-to-exclusion"). (373-376)

   7. Passion's intensity of motions excited aside, knowledge is based, not on agreement (which expresses belief solely), but on acknowledgement encompassing both and is, as such, absolutely relational; for which the incontrovertible aspect of belief is present—but not to the exclusion of all else in every case—to comprise "certain." This is a special category of understanding perception, akin to other mental states (e.g. dreaming, hallucination), but which is contingent on being verifiably non-falsified to experience.—(though again, not beyond all doubt): Statements to the effect that "I know..." are, in themselves, merely an expression of belief [I believe it might interest a philosopher, one who can think himself, to read my notes. For even if I have hit the mark only rarely, he would recognize what targets I had been ceaselessly aiming at]. (377-387)

   ∞ Some sentences are so co-extensive with the language game they look exactly like mirror-ling a piece of its board. (388)

D. Importance

   1. The importance is in whether or not grounds exist for making sense in any statement, text, awareness—a proposition—to be fulfilled usefully: Subjective's belief in state of affairs, even if fancied 'verifiable', for lacking absolute criteria of judgment, need not consider us really. (389-391)

   2. Obviously the capacity for doubt entails an ethical aspect in determining, not whether it is right to do so at any given point (for this is commensurate with the proposition the doubt seeks to make clear), but inasmuch as one must demonstrate there no need to doubt—as questions of doubt are essential to determining real—so as requires the ethical question of judgment: That someone intended before saying it need not follow they meant whole-heartedly its statement (and even if they did, you won't know whether, how seriously, or not until you bother to doubt); so it's best to not go wholly by what people tell you a lot: Even if you derive the consequences, one still accepts the hypothesis in so doing. (392-399)

E. Context

   1. [What do you think the German translation of Don Quijote slants it like?] (400)

   2. Sadly, just stating you're aware of the unity of human experiencing reality doesn't really tell very much usefully about especially yourself. Phrasing statements about the world as if hypotheses in science is not the best idea; unless one is performing, experiment [that is an imperative]. Truth is not unconditional, unless you're talking about god, love, Reality, booze or anything else that guarantees the game's outcome. Regardless of whom, perfect certainty is only dependent on a subject and never on the (hu)man. "But of course there is still a mistake even here." (401-405)

   3. There is: A difference between being questioned by a police officer and some pig who's a cop asking you a question; this is not so with philosophers. (406-409)

   4. The metathesis of human knowledge, real big abstraction to wrap your brain around; individual pieces from it partake of a sharing in its value. Simply misunderstanding the reference of a particular statement's proposition is no grounds at all for objecting.—Of courses hypothetical contraries could be imagined and are always subject to interpretation once found(ed).—That words mean things follows not that the things referred to are inherent in their meaning: An inability to comprehend this proposition is one which fundamentally mistates the nature of representation, and hence is irrefutably in error. Memory (rather than perception) ought to be a more fundamental part of experienced reality. (410-419)

   5. One must never fully preclude the possibility that you're surrounded by madmen all equally convinced of rationality by deluding fools into their pity mistakes as if truth. (420)

   6. The apprehendable totality of context is appropriate confirmation in the truth, a state of affairs. Pragmatism would work if it weren't for the ideology of life-as-worldview. If you're happy with correct opinion—like G. E. Moore—feel free to tell us what it is that you know; if you're looking to be iron-clad of airtight certainty, all doubt ought—likely—not be excluded just because you're correct. For something to be true without caveat, there must be no possible error, either conceivable or historically demonstrated—nevertheless, to say all knowledge amounts to some form of belief is like stating all truth is subject of doubt: Even though that may technically be provable, does not make one any more unreal. (421-425)

A. Right

   1. 193 [see, this one's fucked up because, while the expression is obviously quite clearly stated, the actual sense is highly ambivalent for a number of concerns: 1) the relation between the two parts of the expression is ambiguous at best since one must determine whether the interrogative extends to both aspects of a single expression, or 2) perhaps the second clause is a positive statement (i.e. one which would comprise a complete sentiment if a sentence were itself) rather than expression of doubt: but 3) the impossibility of fixing the reference of 'certain' as a substantive adjective, the solution to which I posit an omitted word for "question" left out because certain questions lead to concretely objective answers of certainty)]; but really, who knows for sure? (193-195)
   2. Within the play of language representing presupposable facts, since the rules of distinction between error are contextual, evidence must be ascertained according to a fixed standard of determination in accepting or rejecting the content of a proposition according to basis in fact whether or not its true or a mistake according to human perception, which is prone to error, but may not be so in any particular case. (196-202)
   3. Cases where there's nothing to speak against, while not exclusive do doubt, can serve as standards for determining 'agreement' in which is reified that hypothetical evidence against does also support—these are "backround" facts necessary to determining what 'real' might or could be, should a particular set of circumstances granted will as given. (203-207)
   4. You don't talk to cities, people in them. 'Kind' marijuana, doesn't grow on trees. (best to omit that proposition) All of these when viewed a certain way may interpret strengthening support for calling language 'non-referential,' hence that since we use language to perceive the world might not exist; this is stupid (if you need, just think about DesCartes): (208-211)
   5. If you're real something, is. (212)
     a. 'What if you're wrong?' ought to be countered with exhuastive justification before "I checked it thorough ('and here's my work/th')" (212-216)
     b. "But your calculation may be, wrong" is neither refutation nor calculation—really more of an idea that goes increasingly a-way as one learns through experience (217-223)

B. Real

'crazy' is only one of two things, "insanity" is both: Doubting one's own sanity and deciding who's not sane. (223)

C. Memorable

   1. Knowledge and memory, totally linked; doubt and forgetting ought, should be even less so. (223-224)
     a. Propositions modify the network of others that gives them their form; the question of knowledge, always one of doubt and practical use. (224-230)
     b. "If someone doubted...our not doubting them...should have to be imparting a picture of...things that stand fast for me." (231-234)
     c. Which you can't accurately call me dumb or gullible for that alone, "'cause, that's just...like, your opinion; m-an." (235)
   2. Controverting established fact takes insanity or a genius, either way a lot of work (experience, religious belief, sexuality may tend to grant exemptions) (236-242.5)
     a. "I believe this with certainty" means: One has compelling grounds ready to provide with possibility of demonstration that rational people can be convinced of as well; knowing implies requisite belief, which alone itself is not constitutive of truth even as relates to subjective states (i.e. pain or happiness, other subjective states whose expression may be truthful, even sincere, but if they can't be verified don't count as something you know) (242-249)
     b. To doubt certain truths removes the foundation of knowledge, not sanity. (247)
   3. Confirmation of truths as self-evident reinforces no belief of knowledge by further evidence since it is a condition of certainty, a methodological understanding, rather than fact to be determined in itself; every reasonable soul is aware of generally common facts which—though they might be doubted for some purpose in a particular instance—cannot seriously be called into question by anyone with sense. (250-255, om. 253)
     a. If so inclined, one can doubt anything forever. (CCLIII)

D. Serious

   1. Please deal with the following:
     a. Foucault has a certain coinage of category he refers to as 'quasi-transcendentals' which are certain facts of human experience whose categories continue as long as there is human to perceive—things like working, talking about stuff, words for a hard life; crazy & cops, getting laid as a subject—but which are always, forever debatable and developing over time: The idea of human relations shifting in a world of real-time objects. (256-263)
     b. [I don't know what to make of this] (264)
   2. The difference, slight, between knowledge and its expression—games aside—is always one of grounding truths in compelling justifications which correspond, not necessarily with observable reality, but with the criteria for truth as laid out in advance, a particular frame of reference, discursive practice or state of objective affairs... (265-270)
     a. But that doesn't mean that you get to alone decide all for yourself. (271)
   3. On Certainty's Test Screen (NC-17
   for adult themes—if not just a 'Hard R')

"I shall not today attempt further to
Define the kinds of material I
Understand to be embraced within that
Shorthand description; and perhaps I could
Never succeed in intelligibly
Doing so. But I know it when I see it,
And the motion picture involved in this
Case is not that." -Justice Potter Stewart (271-275)

   4. Knowing 'The Truth Is Out There' doesn't follow you get to know what it is. (276-278)

E. Verified

   1. Erroneous beliefs are those which do not fit in with the totality of a person's other statements of belief acquired through empirical acquisition of subjective truths corresponding to greater and lesser degrees of validity as determined from an outside, but not arbitrary, subject position. (279-281)
     a. Best way to handle asinine statements of belief is determine their probable source and that of the error independently—be careful with kids, they are the meta-solutions to all language gaming—even if someone denies their belief, what they do is reveal its truth; whether you like it or not. (282-284)
     b. Don't be like the guy who lost his keys in the furthest corner of the parking lot's dark: He went to go look under that streetlamp, for near the light was best. (285)
   2. What we believe...isn't possible to get to...but...people who believe...it sometimes happens...these people do not know...so sure of their belief...and we know it...is evidently the poorer one by far. (286)

F. Where L.W. Started Dating - 23.9.50¹

   1. As human beings, certain instincts need not be justified, like active and predicative. (287)
     a. Certain facts are established, confirmed in writing, sometimes which is correct, and even other things; knowledge handed down is believable inasmuch as grounds for doubt there lack, incontrovertibly so when all else speaks in confirmation (including written words): (288)
     b. Ordinarily, one might say this is by oneself as "know/n" and other people understand (or believe too) as that's a fact. (288)
   2. At that point, you may have your X-Files party. (289-290)
   3. Ultimately, belief might have to be one's sole (one soul's) grounds for certainty. (291)
     a. To keep testing after verified confirmation increases the probability of screwing up and seeing things wrong. (292)
     b. ...depending on the elevation. (293-294)
   4. Empirical precedent is not proof, just a damn fine indicator of the right to make an assumption (295)
     a. So long as you don't get dogmatic about it. (296)
   5. It's always good to remember that conclusions might not follow results as outcome does experiment: "`Concluded' by'' means ''of interpretation'.'
   6. From within a given community (one person, the whole world, and some point in between). (298-299):

A: Wir davon sind überzeugt, erfüllt dass ist rund die Erde?

preview of the English/German edition

1- The McCarran Act, passed on September 23, 1950, authorized preventive detention of suspected subversives and required Communist Party members to register with the attorney general. -Who Speaks for America?... (Alterman, 1998)

A. Proposition

   1. Levels of reality, modality, corresponding to varying degrees of phenomenological assurance with consequences for memory, perceptions, certainty—an instance ought not alter belief in the capacity of truth; there's no such thing as perfect performers, only performances looking perfect. (66-68)
   2. If you're wrong about truth, you can still be correct; just won't know when or how: Possibility of error implies neither its presence nor consequence. (69-70)
   3. False beliefs are not delusions (unless you try to convince people knowingly as true). (71-72)

B. Structure

   1. Difference between error and "mental disturbance," their treatment, relates between context and basis in quality of belief—though non-prescriptive—as the fulfilliment of a blank significance so that verification of its conditions achieves a totality; or you've got reason not. (73-78)
   2. Ignorance is an error, not its excuse. (79-82)
     a. As facts proposed of experience may relate to our conceptual framework, certain propositions, such as 'reality (is)' cannot be independently refuted according to an-other line of logic; but that doesn't exclude grounds for doubting the validity of any particular purported as fact from context. (83-85)
     b. Softening all statements of knowledge to mere supposition does not make for any greater accuracy as relates to excluding, doubt, doesn't practically verify belief since 'known' corresponds to a knowable fact, not its belief—whether one calls it "the real world" or 'truth-as-being-perceives'; that the mind is capable of perceiving reality grants no access to the foundations of knowledge in the same way your car's keys cannot diagnose their engine: Levels of contextualized belief correspoding as knowledge lead to certain 'common sense' of propositions, others which are only intuited by that absense of logical grounds for doubt (which is nevertheless almost already possible). (86-93)
   3. You can't verify the entire world as fact [I know; I watched the American fbi try]. (94)
     a. Rules can be intuited from a structured system of symbols, despite contingencies of knowing, because solid propositions and developing states of affairs are not sharply divided, though there is a reversibility of position between proposition and rule. (95-98)
     b. That does not follow that every propositional thing is debatable, neither that one needs accept all of one's statements nor that inability to describe systematically all implications of a proposition or series means their structure lacks overall coherence. (99-102)
     c. Empirically, the belief in irrefutability may derive from a reciprocally advancing process of determining and doubt rather than logical 'connect the dots.' (103)

C. Judge

   1. Arguments—confirmation and questioning doubt—take place within a system which is/guarantees the veracity of their conclusion; since knowledge is acquired, as its false belief, within some framework for interpreting it there is (n)ever grounds to exclude all doubt: There are means for determining. (105-109)
     a. How this is accomplished in method: Explanation, which always has an antecedent objective term, must eventually arrive at some end that doesn't. (109-110)
     b. Actual vs. contra-factual or hypothetical circumstances differ as in the application of its general rule against the factual validity of some propositions, which is to say, certain truths—and of words—require knowledge of some particular state of affairs.
   2. "115. If you tried to doubt everything you would not get as far as doubting anything. The game of doubting itself presupposes certainty." (116)
     a. Doubting one's own experience, when futile and frivolous, corresponding to no explainable fact of experience requires some justification which is based on interpretation of a verified proposition.—which follows in that case if there are no objections, that would mean you're cool. (117-118)
     b. Conversely, that nothing speaks against does not follow 'everything speaks it's true.' (119)
   3. But if the guy's not hurting anybody, we should let him doubt (120)
     a. (though the ability to equivocate doubting and knowledge need not imply its necessity—grounds for doubt : real good idea—but you may want to consider what a doubt would look like in a particular circumstance first). (121-123)
     b. Judgments build off of being based on prior ones, even if wrong; words in context are judged to have meaning according to a system itself by virture of what it is not as an acquired habit of establishing facts (i.e. "judging"). (124-128)

D. Means

   1. Having learned to judge as its own capacity: (129)
     a. Experience, though the process to have learned judging, ought not be the grounds for forming judgment since facts and accepted truths change, just as there are propositions not judged empirically and formulations of laws so ruled. (130-133)
     b. It teaches certain experiences as impossible which hypotheticals can represent as conceivable. (134)
     c. Precedent as a principle for logical reasoning is more a tendency than absolute rule, still to be excluded; common sense is a defense against needing to test out everything, always [cf. names and pronouns]. (135-136)
   2. Certain propositions are needed for to determine facts in experience so that personal considerations lead not to mere opinions' objections over argument, just because someone says and seems sure to know is only a profession of belief (unless these are foundational, in the which none can be said to have knowledgeable belief for they are of a class "in the system of our empirical judgments"). (136-137)
   3. Any application of rules in practice can never be absolute because principles and examples mirror each other in the process of forming judgments according to rules, and of learning through experience, which relate always to previous judgments, not to all of them together. (139-140)
     a. Belief is not of isolated facts but towards the system what their proposition is comprised of while abstract rules they relate to form networks of consequences and premise in support. (141-144)
     b. As abstracted from particulars or intuited of universal, some of these change while others are liable to stand fixed according to where and how it fits amongst the propositions of truth around it with respect to an interpretation of experience which might be incorrect (but must be shown as such for that proposition to be believed). (144-145)
   4. Metaphors and calculations go together like assumption and decision in the language game. (146-148)
   5. You want subjective?—[m]y judgments themselves characterize the way I judge, characterize the nature of judgment. (149)
     a. One's self is standard for judgment in relation to other people judging as a non-negative act, for it is not possible to derive absolute or universal truth factually in sole relation to one subject; otherwise, this is merely a deeply held conviction, never true knowledge of wisdom. (150-151)
     b. Learning the propositions true of oneself is a process of discovering subsequent to their realization, propositions can not be presupposed in their assertion [unless you're AP] and particular doubts should never be assumed as either uniform or consistent in their application. (153-154)
     c. The proven impossibility of making an error does not imply its inevitable conclusion, especially in hindsight. [known as the Couldn't Have Been That Hard If It's Right syndrome] (155-158)
     d. Making the same mistake as everyone else, is the cause of error and source of its refutation (156)
   6. Certain things are true whether or not one believes them; some of them are relevant, others merely there (easy to say, hard to sort out). (159-160)

E. Trust

   1. As you learn on other people's authority, and sometimes things get improved upon, certain facts are dependent on a world-view corresponding to various degrees of testability resting on a foundational assumption that there is something true which tests might also prove, all of which (and its absense's starting point) constitute the cycle of knowledge and learning as play within a cognitive system of linguistic, textual utterances in performance. (161-166)
     a. Statements derived from experience can be made to pass from empirical proposition to normative description (itself an empirical matter, but nevermind this) because they are not ultimately incommensurate with each other in reality (167-170)
     b. [this moon example—like English vs. German from before—is interesting because that didn't used to be possible and some idiots still think that today] (171-173)
   2. "I act with complete certainty..." (174)
   3. But this certainty is my own... 'I know it' (174-175)
     a. You can say you kind of know and, by qualifying your claims to knowing truth, end up much more accurate; and you still believe what you know. (175-177)
     b. The necessarily subjective basis of knowledge and subjectivity of particular statements must not be called the same; except when they are (and you're sure: But to ask someone). (177-181)
   4. If finite, means it exists for a duration of space time [re's extensa's get too phallic: Inappropriate!] which may not be perceivable, but can be intuited; these things are pretty damn certain, but subject to refinement in point of fact. (182-186)
   5. When people ask you inane questions, just tell them someone smart and important said so; or that you can't tell who. (187)
     a. "Subject for modification to improve" doesn't mean 'wrong'. (188)
    b0. Interpretation of knowing is an unavoidable element, even historically (the converse tends to dissolve). (189-190)
     b1. There is no other way to determine factual correspondence with reality to a degree of satisfaction—personally—to keep asking if it's real is the cropped pup chasing was-tail. (191)
     b2. Could keep going forever but to be sure must make an end point. (192)

de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Über_Gewißheit

Women in the enchanted and enchanting world of Harry Potter are anything but second-class citizens.

(from Harry Potter and Philosophy edited by David Bagget and Shawn E. Klein)

Key points on Hermione

1. Hard Work
2. Logic
3. Knowledge
4. Rational

Sources

• John Stuart Mill, On Liberty and On the Subjection of Women
• Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
  

A. Knowing (2-21)

   1. Ability to doubt not implying necessity, the essence of language might imply its own need to be, in playing, satisfied of conditions. (2-3)
     a. Since doubt is its own negative, its can never be fully exorcised; but correct belief, i.e. "knowing (known)," can be achieved according to its own definition of the rules imagined as mental state. (4-6)
     b. Knowing that certainty is identical where subjectivity can not be substituted in falsifying its negation leads to doubting what can, but ought not, be doubted and to claiming frivolities as truth. (7-10)
   2. Real knowing is a special designation guaranteeing the state of affairs proposed without simply disproving a converse (which is merely a necessary stage to sufficient demonstration): (11-14)
     a. 'True' must show no mistake was made or could have been—established objectively—given a statement in reference of some thing. (15-17)
   3. Knowing implies a proper foundation for the claim in relation to an other, who upon accepting the rules as layed out (stated or no), has to have the ability to conceive of how* this is true in itself, or show how it is unreal by some other means. (18-19)
     a. Doubting any given state of affairs entails disproof by means of alternative demonstration; simply showing some one, thing to be in error does not mean you're correct (for you may also be wrong). (20)
     b. If the possibility of having made an error is omitted, the statement amounts to mere opinion—even if correct. (21)

B. Doubting (21-35)

 1. 'Knowledge' based on subjective states is always contingent upon a given assumption to guarantee the potential and factual validity of the proposition of a certain individual. (21-22)
 2. Belief in the statement of one deemed truthful does not preclude the possibility of their error, merely a belief in the expression of knowledge; but denial of this capacity accepts no grounds for truth. (23)
     a. Doubting a statement about reality ought proceed from questioning a description in the form of a sincere question in particular circumstances, rather than abstract formulations, to exclude error imagined 'in normal circumstances'—generally speaking—to be determined according to the non-normative instance(s): (24-27)
     b. Learning a rule is to err in its application which cannot be foreseen as such. (28)
 3. 'How do you get to Carnegie Hall?' "Mal-practice, man—practice." (29)
 4. After you check—without mindlessly repeating the same steps—go ahead & make your announcement; should the problematic proposition not go away, figure out which unquestionable assumption has changed to wrong and get rid of what doesn't work. (30-33)
 5. Since 'because teacher says' and senses, "special instances of perception" are rules and exception which imply a reality where failure to decide need not imply doubt, certainty of experience is not a proposition asking is. (34 & 35)

C. Objecting (36-57)

 1. 'Reality' is a logical concept, not a physical object; this is how non-sense states the existence of that which cannot be falsified in terms which mistate the nature of the issue being questioned: (36)
     a. The first formulation of a question or its answer may not be appropriately stated at all so that one must look to research the fundamental assumptions upon which calculations are based (37-38)
     b. What goes on in your head or a process is worthless except as relates to formulating a useful statement—so long as the calculation is correctly assumed to be sound; questions and statements of knowledge presuppose a mode of certainty better expressed by: (38-40)
     c.  'A is a proposition' knowing only as knowledge of verifiable facts
      c1. Subjective purely and non-specified statements are equally noxious. (41)
      c2. In false statements, belief and knowledge are indistinguishable; but real calculations maintain a distinction between 'not-false' & true. (42-43)
      c3. To ask a rule for 'not-miscalculate' is tautologically backwards. (44)
 2. We got to know the nature of calculating by learning to calculate. (45)
 3. Of describing calculations reliably no rule can emerge, for it is the act of applying one—independent of time or transcendental conceived—but some are fixed, others contingent; certainty's decision for a practical intention... (46-49)
     a. statements in language incapable of being checked like equations, being-play'/d by rule to be officiated
      a1. The concept of context distinguishes mathematical from linguistic propositions, which differ in their universal, particular instances; but not ultimately so. (50-52)
      a2. In propositions, quality and essence may be granted co-extensive but universals and particular are no more sure than each other, for if not all statements about physical objects could be wrong—which is silly. (53-54)
     b. language-game as a fact of conceiving reality
      b1. Universal falsification—nihil hypothesis. (55)
      b2. Certainty is neither more an object than "physical objects" or 'unreality' but nor is it arbitrary construction:
      b3. It is a conditional proposition of logic and language. (56-57)

D. Gaming (55-65)

 1. As a hypothesis—i.e. proposition to be determined through verification and attempt to falsify—physical objects can't `not exist' because denying their reality requires a contradiction of its statement to exist as truth. (55-56)
 2. To look at statements purporting knowledge—propositions—as though their grammatical status guarantees some validity must be divorced from a perceiving subject to be true:
 3. Knowledge must therefore be logical and presupposed as a possibility without being derived purely from the propositions on which it is predicated. (57-61)
     a. Meanings are acquired through usage, also learned, and correlate with the concepts of definition and rule. (61-62)
     b. Contra-factual hypotheses lead to altering the relation of words as represent reality. (63)

Meaning sets the rules of language as definitions, while discourse is of words contingent in shifting their usage (64-65)

http://budni.by.ru/oncertainty.html

به شدت درگيرش شدم......

پژوهشهاي فلسفي......لودويگ ويتگنشتاين...........نشر مركز.....ترجمه فريدون فاطمي

لينكهاي مرتبط

آشنايي مختصر با ويتگنشتاين - فارسي

متن پژوهشهاي فلسفي  - انگليسي

Tal parece ser la propuesta que encierra el texto de Françoise Fontenau, La ética del silencio, que pretende abordar algunos de los aspectos del pensamiento de Jacques Lacan y de Ludwig Wittgenstein. El pensamiento y el lenguaje han dado y siguen dando mucho qué pensar a multiplicidad de disciplinas en la actualidad.

En momentos cruciales como el que vivimos en que la comunicación adquiere dimensiones vertiginosas, debido a la cibernética cuyas consecuencias y repercusiones son aún insospechadas, pareciera que mientras el hombre moderno navega a sus anchas en la red, naufraga sin timón en una sociedad de consumo, de apariencias, que lo conducen a una competitividad irreflexiva y a un aislamiento “detrás de la pantalla”.

Pero, ¿en qué se nos convierte el mundo “detrás de la pantalla”? Quizá sea útil que ante la amenaza de “diluirnos ante las pantallas de cristal líquido” retomemos los textos que disertan en torno a algunos de los aspectos más humanos de lo humano: el pensamiento y el lenguaje.

Wittgenstein parte de premisas fundamentales que aún hoy dan mucho que pensar. “El hecho sólo es hecho a partir de ser dicho”.

Para él el mundo es “mi” mundo y los límites de éste se limitan a lo que puede ser dicho. El decir precede al saber. Se introduce después en la complejidad del signo y nos dice: “La torpeza del signo para hacerse comprender a través de toda suerte de gestos, desparece no bien reconocemos que todo depende del sistema al que pertenece el signo. Uno querría decir: únicamente el pensamiento puede decirlo, no el signo. Y sin embargo, una interpretación realmente es algo que nos es dado en el signo”.

No sólo el objeto de la consciencia es una proposición, sino que es una proposición dicha. En Wittgenstein la relación con el objeto, en el sentido trascendental, es inconcebible en ausencia de una posibilidad de enunciación. En la proposición siete del Tractatus enuncia: “Aquello de lo que no se puede hablar, hay que callarlo”.

El silencio adoptaría entonces el lugar de ese “más” que no tuvo sentido. Esta sentencia da mucho que pensar y enlaza aquí con la problemática del decir en Lacan. Desde el seminario escribe: “Antes de la palabra, nada es ni deja de serlo. Sin duda, todo está allí, pero sólo con la palabra hay cosas que son verdaderas o falsas, es decir, que son, y cosas que no son. La verdad se abre camino en lo real precisamente con la dimensión de la palabra. Antes de ella no hay verdadero ni falso”.

Otra afirmación de Lacan en su seminario es que en Wittgenstein no hay metalenguaje. Según él, (...) “no hay metalenguaje que pueda ser hablado; más aforísticamente: no hay Otro del Otro.

Fontenau se pregunta en este punto, con respecto a Lacan: sin embargo, ¿no recurre él al Nombre-del-Padre para apuntalar su mística, su ética, para sostener su lógica?

Por su parte, Wittgenstein, en sus Conferencias trasluce un Nombre-del-Padre dividido, una divinidad y luego unida donde se necesita un lazo entre la existencia del mundo y la ética, la palabra de Dios.

En lo que respecta al deseo, ética y deseo están íntimamente ligados en sicoanálisis, mientras que para Wittgenstein los que hacen pareja son más bien ética y sentido.

Wittgenstein llega al “no hay más que decir” precisamente queriendo “salvar la verdad”, deseando convertirla en la regla y en el fundamento del saber. ¿Cuál es entonces el Wittgenstein que nos presenta Lacan? No uno confinado al silencio por la consciencia de haberlo dicho todo o no poder decir más, sino un hombre extenuado por esa búsqueda sin descanso de la designación justa y que termina por no hablar más.

En Lacan más bien destaca el Wittgenstein que nos habla de “malestar mental” en sus Cursos de Cambridge, “Malestar mental” en Wittgenstein, “queja del sujeto” en Lacan.

Por consiguiente, lo que nos lleva a pasar del sentido a la denotación es la búsqueda y el deseo de verdad. Lacan subraya aquí la importancia de esa verdad para Wittgenstein, esa “cuestión de la verdad (que) condiciona en su esencia el fenómeno de la locura”.

* La Jornada
* http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2008/05/09/index.php?section=opinion&article=a08a1cul

DICCELO TU, Ludwig:

Descrivi l’aroma del caffè! – Perché non si riesce? Ci mancano le parole? E per che cosa ci mancano? – Ma da dove viene l’idea che una descrizione siffatta possa essere possibile? Non hai mai sentito la mancanza di una descrizione del genere? Hai cercato di descrivere l’aroma del caffè senza riuscirci?

(Vorrei dire: “Queste note dicono qualcosa di grandioso, ma non so che cosa”. […] Un grave cenno del capo. James: “Ci mancano le parole”).¹

Da giorni, ormai, tafferugli di considerevole gravità minacciano la quiete di casa mia. Attori: me (l’unica fessacchiotta della famiglia che al momento abbia tempo da perdere “per il bene comune”) e l’imbianchino, il quale, onde evitare altre inutili tensioni e nel rispetto della sua privacy, verrà identificato con lo pseudonimo di Mimmuzzo, che mi pare un nome che “fa molto artigiano”. In nero.

Andiamo al dunque. Il problema che sta per deteriorare il rapporto tra me e il Mimmuzzo è di natura cognitiva: non si riesce a comprendersi riguardo la sfumatura di colore con cui tinteggiare la terrazza. Si dirà: utilizzate campioni! Ma Mimmuzzo è un pittore duro&puro, lui i colori ce li ha già tutti schedati e numerati in testa. Peccato che la sua nomenclatura non corrisponda con la mia.

Io dico: “Fammi un bel giallo, ma non troppo intenso” e mi ritrovo con la parete beige foglia morente.

“No Mimmo, non ho detto beige, ma giallo”

“Ah, questo ti pare beige? Ma è giallo paglierino! Come fai a dire che beige?!”

“Allora, Mimmù, diciamo che è giallo paglierino ma che non fa per me. Aggiungigli un po’ di giallo…come dire…giallo giallo”

“Mmm…”

E, come per magia…la parete si tinse di giallo canarino. Appollaiato su un limone di Sicilia.

“Oh Mì, bello questo colore, però sai, d’estate col sole…forse risulta troppo acceso, abbagliante, direi…”

“E te lo avevo detto io! Meglio il paglierino”

“Grrrr! Senti Mimmuzzo, facciamo così: ora io, con calma, ti spiego quale colore ho in mente per queste cazzo di pareti di questo cazzo di terrazzino: GIALLO, ci sei? Bene, immagina il giallo standard, quello che subito si accende nella tua testolina appena senti la parola “GIALLO”. Ora, immagina di togliere la parte gialla-gialla e di sostituirla con un pò di arancione, ma poco poco, tanto per scaldare questo giallo standard. Mi segui?Quindi, abbiamo un giallo melone, che è ancora troppo luminoso, così se mettiamo un po’ di nero per incupire dovrebbe risultare un ocra standard che andiamo a sdrammatizzare con del bianco così da ottenere uno strepitoso giallo da parete! Tutto chiaro?”

La parete adesso è color ginestra anemica. Originale, direi.

¹ L. Wittgenstein, Ricerche filosofiche, § 610.

Vom Sprechen im Alltag

Ludwig Wittgenstein vs Herbert Marcuse

«435. Wenn man fragt 'Wie macht der Satz das, dass er darstellt?' — so könnte die Antwort sein: 'Weißt du es denn nicht? Du siehst es doch, wenn du ihn benützt.' Es ist ja nichts verborgen.
Wie macht der Satz das? — Weißt du es denn nicht? Es ist ja nichts versteckt.
Aber auf die Antwort 'Du weißt ja, wie es der Satz macht, es ist ja nichts verborgen' möchte man erwidern: 'Ja, aber es fließt alles so rasch vorüber, und ich möchte es gleichsam breiter auseinander gelegt sehen.'
436. Hier ist es leicht, in jene Sackgasse des Philosophierens zu geraten, wo man glaubt, die Schwierigkeit der Aufgabe liege darin, dass schwer erhaschbare Erscheinungen, die schnell entschlüpfende gegenwärtige Erfahrung oder dergleichen, von uns beschrieben werden sollen. Wo die gewöhnliche Sprache uns zu roh erscheint, und es scheint, als hätten wir es nicht mit den Phänomenen zu tun, von denen der Alltag redet, sondern 'mit den leicht entschwindenden, die mit ihrem Auftauchen und Vergehen jene ersteren annähernd erzeugen'. (Augustinus: Manifestissima et usitatissima sunt, et eadem rursus nimis latent, et nova est inventio eorum.)»

(Aus Ludwig Wittgenstein: Philisophische Untersuchungen I, Suhrkamp Verlag 1971)

«Wittgensteins endloses Sprachspiel mit Bausteinen oder Herr Schulze und Herr Müller, die sich unterhalten, können als Beispiele dienen. Trotz der einfachen Klarheit des Beispiels bleiben die Sprecher und ihre Situation unbestimmt. Sie sind X und Y, wie vertraut sie auch miteinander plaudern. Im wirklichen Universum der Sprache aber sind X und Y 'Geister'. Sie existieren nicht; sie sind das Produkt des analytischen Philosophen. Natürlich ist das Gespräch von X und Y völlig verständlich, und der Sprachanalytiker appelliert mit Recht an das normale Verständnis gewöhnlicher Menschen. Aber in Wirklichkeit verstehen wir einander nur durch ganze Bereiche des Mißverständnisses und Widerspruchs hindurch. Das wirkliche Universum der Alltagssprache ist das des Kampfes ums Dasein.»

(Aus Herbert Marcuse: Der eindimensionale Mensch, Luchterhand Verlag 1967)

Aquél que dedicó su vida a la tarea de pensar conoció los fantasmas de la insania, la pobreza (habiendo sido uno de los hombres más ricos de Europa), la soledad y el suicidio; revolucionó la filosofía occidental en dos ocasiones; la primera, cuando contaba con tan sólo 20 años y, la segunda, en plena madurez, cuando rondaba los 50. Sacudió los fundamentos y las certezas de la filosofía tradicional, por tanto, a partir de sus enunciaciones la filosofía y el hombre no pueden ser ya pensados de la misma forma. Sus palabras fueron profecías de nuevos tiempos, de nuevas formas de entender al ser humano, el lenguaje y el pensamiento, la razón y el sentido. Con la apertura que su obra implica, la teoría filosófica al estilo tradicional, los paradigmas universales y trascendentales, las certezas y el sentido único resultan ya inaceptables. Los imperativos y los principios categoriales llegan a su fin. Su propuesta plantea un adiós definitivo a los fundamentos.

Para Wittgenstein, la racionalidad que puede haber en el lenguaje conlleva mil juegos y contextos distintos, con reglas diferentes para cada uno. Cualquier significado y cualquier sentido que emane del lenguaje siempre es relativo, lo demás son tan sólo fantasmas.

Su teorización acerca del sentido no lo conduce a una nueva teoría sino, por el contrario, a la exclusión de todas ellas.

La filosofía wittgensteniana libera de los agobios y esclavitudes que generan los problemas mal planteados que agitan al espíritu humano. Problemas que pretenden, vía argumentos lógicos y en extremo racionalizados y cerrados y que a ese nivel no significan, en realidad, nada ni tienen solución ni son problemas ni sus planteamientos y resoluciones resultan útiles ni válidos.

Para Wittgenstein, el lenguaje consiste en mil juegos, el uso diario de las palabras genera todo y cualquier sentido en el mundo. Cualquier significado y sentido de las cosas es relativo siempre. Concibe la filosofía como una terapia del espíritu, claridad de pensamientos para alcanzar una paz en el pensar que desemboque en una serena convivencia en soledad.

En palabras del propio pensador: “La filosofía es una praxis analítica y crítica del lenguaje, un estilo de vida y de pensar, no una doctrina”.

La filosofía, para él, no es un cuerpo doctrinal, no tiene un lenguaje propio ni un método concreto, tan sólo intenta, a partir de preguntas sin fin, aclarar las cosas mediante el esclarecimiento de su presentación lingüística.

En 1916, sin ambages, sentenció que la primera condición para filosofar es la desconfianza en la gramática. Vemos aquí una feliz coincidencia con el pensamiento de Nietzsche, cuando el filósofo alemán, sin concesión alguna de su parte, enunciaba:

“Ah, la razón, esa vieja hembra embustera. No nos liberaremos de Dios mientras sigamos creyendo en la gramática” (1888).

La propuesta filosófica de Wittgenstein nos conduce a preguntarnos si cuando hablamos en verdad decimos algo, y si decimos algo en verdad, qué decimos y desde dónde lo hacemos, desde qué juego lingüístico, qué contexto, qué forma de vida. Para él, las palabras también son acciones, que denotan, según la forma de expresión lingüística “fines, deseos o vacíos concretos”.

Sus obras, tanto el Tractatus como Investigaciones plantean un profundo cuestionamiento a las potencialidades de la razón, que en cierta forma prolonga el advenimiento de la aguda crítica que sobre la razón, la certeza, el sentido único, la centralidad y la fijeza ha emprendido el pensamiento posmoderno.

* La Jornada
* http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2008/04/25/index.php?section=opinion&article=a04a1cul